Introduction
Some thinkers, Nietzsche observed, are born posthumously. Slighted or ignored by their contemporaries, they are vindicated by later generations. Far more common, however, is the reverse path: writers celebrated in their own time do not survive its passing. The career of Raymond Aron in Anglophone sociology attests to just this fate.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Aron achieved international fame as a journalist, scholar, and an interlocutor of the powerful; Henry Kissinger and Maurice Schumann were among his more regular discussants. While the French marxisant Left condemned Aron as a reactionary and a cold war apologist (he was neither), intellectuals across the Channel took a more sensible view. Aron's combative liberalism was understood, if not always admired. But British sociologists recognized a thinker of rare quality, engaging with issues of real importance, whose work deserved serious attention.
British recognition came early. During the war, Aron was based in London editing and writing a column for France Libre French forces under General de Gaulle. 'Karl Mannheim, who was teaching at the London School of Economics, was my host on several occasions', Aron (1990: 133) recalled. Towards war's end, Morris Ginsberg urged Aron to take up a permanent position at the LSE. Impatient to return to France, he declined: 'I would be French or have no country.' 1 Still, when the LSE-based British Journal of Sociology (1950a; and 1950b ) its opening article.
More LSE tributes followed, among them the Auguste Comte Memorial Trust Lecture (1957 ), an Honorary Fellowship (1973 , the Millennium Lecture on International Studies (1978) , and the Government and Opposition Lecture (1981) . Robert Colquhoun's (1986a; 1986b) magisterial intellectual biography of Aron was originally an LSE doctoral thesis pursued under the supervision of Donald MacRae. Three Directors of the School, albeit sometimes in pre-LSE incarnations, also took notice of Aron's work. Introducing Aron's Millennium Lecture on 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 'War and Industrial Society: A Reappraisal', Ralf Dahrendorf declared 'There cannot be a more sophisticated analyst of the socio-economics, the politics and the philosophy of war in the world today' (Aron 1978: 195) . Anthony Giddens's (1973: 59-63, 76-8) judgement was cooler; advancing his own account of class structure required Giddens to challenge the 'industrial society' thesis of his older French rival. Similarly, Craig Calhoun (2012 Calhoun ( [1989 ) dissented, albeit mildly, both from Aron's characterization of the French revolution of 1848 and from his interpretation of witnesses (Marx, Comte, Tocqueville) who took its measure. 2 Sociologists today show little interest in Aron's legacy. Why is that? This article examines Aron's British reception in his own day to help account for his eclipse as a sociologist in ours. An archive of British university teaching materials housed at the LSE, and assessments of Aron's books, are my main reference points. The next two sections are devoted to the assessments; in them, I include both British and American appraisals because they point in the same direction. The third section, examining the archive materials, draws on purely British sources. Given the descriptive and explanatory objectives of this article I seek here neither to defend paper, can I provide a full analysis of Aron's major commentators: in order of importance, John A. Hall, Ernest Gellner, Tom Bottomore and Anthony Giddens. A point worth bearing in mind as we proceed, however, is that the evaluation of Aron among British sociologists is also a window onto the discipline itself. It shows what sociologists consider distinctly sociological methods and arguments sociologists and social theorists. It shows, in short, both the demands and the limits of the sociological imagination as currently construed.
Sociologist Without a System
The 1960s to the mid-1970s witnessed the high-water mark of Aron's global Main Currents in Sociological Thought on Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Comte, Marx and the uprisings of 1848. Hailed as a triumph of civilized exposition, adjectives such as 'lucid', 'graceful', 'wise', 'judicious', 'urbane', 'elegant', 'insightful', 'perspicacious' and 'fair-minded' abound in the commentaries. 3 2 delivered the Montague Burton Lecture on 'Imperialism and Colonialism' in Leeds, and the1965 Gifford Lectures in Aberdeen on the topic of 'Historical Consciousness in Thought and Action'. But London was his British base. Perhaps his greatest work on the philosophy of history was delivered there in 1960 (Aron 2002a) . 3 II (Aron 1967a ) was far less appreciated, even by writers who admired Aron. MacRae (1968) called it 'tired', its bibliography 'ludicrously inadequate', and its discussion of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 Yet from the beginning of the 1960s, reviewers express reservations that spell trouble for Aron's sociological appropriation. The most common complaint is that of the AJS as 'a kind of French Walter Lippmann', Benjamin Barber (1962: 592-3) 4 noted the fertile 'overlap' between 'the problems of sociology and philosophy' that Aron's work embraced. A downside was that 'Aron's essays are less systematic in theory and less rigorous in method and data than most sociologists would now like to be in their professional writing.' Writing in the BJS, Charles Madge (1962: 78-9 ) struck a similar note. Aron's breadth of vision was remarkable -'Philosophy, history, sociology; around these three conceptions the agile mind of M. Aron never tires of playing' -yet this 'diversity of guises' loses 'something in theoretical rigor'.
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A related set of criticisms concerned Aron's failure to articulate a rigorous, precise and systematic concept of the 'social'. The indictment was by no means arbitrary; Aron himself emphasized that sociology only emerges when thinkers self-consciously seek to grasp 'the social as such' and to theorize its distinctiveness from politics, regime or state (Aron, 1965: 8-9; cf. Aron, 1967a: vi) . Roland Robertson (1966: 191-8 ) leveled a number of objections. One is that Aron's delineation of 'the boundaries of sociological analysis [is] not easy to follow'. Those boundaries are either too porous (Montesquieu and Tocqueville are evidently political writers and it is their political contribution that Aron so evidently values) or too impervious: can politics really be separated from the social? Whether 'political phenomena should be seen as a sub-category of a wider class of social phenomena is an issue about which Aron says very little ' (192) .
Another oddity for Robertson is that 'having stressed the aim of grasping the social as such those sociologists who have concentrated on doing just this'. The obvious case is Durkheim towards whom Aron exhibits a frank distaste. 'In a similarly ambiguous fashion, Aron, although at pains to point up the limitations in Marx's infrastructuresuperstructure model, nevertheless states that modern societies can often best be understood in terms of their economic infrastructure.
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Durkheim unjust. Indeed, Aron 'stresses what has been ephemeral [in Durkheim] -the ethical aspiration, the pedagogy and the concern about the social solidarity of the French at the expense of the actual sociological achievement '. Coser (1965: 948-9) and Torrance (1969: 255) also found the Durkheim chapter tendentious. Not everyone agreed. Barbu (1968: 771) claimed that from 'an expository viewpoint, Durkheim gets by far the fairest deal', while Runciman's review (1968: 308-9) 
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Sociological Amnesia 20 stem from the assumption that one must either be a sociological reductionist or true that this dichotomy has relevance to any critique of Marx and Comte; but Aron seems to have allowed these two men to set the problem for him, instead of explicating it himself and then discussing their work … Thus, although Aron is keen to discuss the boundaries between the sciences of man, he is never completely successful in this respect (1966: 194-5 ).
The problem is compounded, Robertson continues, by the fact that Aron 'a clear formulation of the theoretical basis' of social analysis. It is doubtless true that Tocqueville's emphasis on social and cultural constraints contains an thinker, especially for students of American society. But Aron employs neither Tocqueville nor Montesquieu 'to elaborate systematically a precise conception of social phenomena'.
6 Even when writing on Marx, Aron misses the opportunity to engage with contemporary sociological discussions of class structure. Hence despite Aron's 'ability to spot intriguing nuances' in the work of the classic … that his program of analysis has not been consistently carried out ' (ibid.: 198) .
The weakness of Aron's articulation of the social also perplexed Martin Albrow (1969: 112-14) when he reviewed the second volume of Main Currents. Albrow acknowledges Aron's gifts of erudite and controlled exegesis -the chapter on Pareto is especially commended for being sine ira et studiobut taxes him for matters that bear directly on theory itself and for 'critical comments' that 'seem so puny in relation to their targets'. John Torrance (1969: 255-6) concurred. While the condensation of Durkheim, Pareto and Weber is 'elegant' and 'judicious', as a 'critical exposition, however, it is distinctly disappointing'. Yet, for Albrow more than for Torrance, a much greater problem is Aron's 'facile' ontology. Aron criticizes Durkheim's social realism by insisting that only human groups, rather than a society, actually exist. But to invoke a human group is already to take up a common ground with Durkheim for it gives the collectivity a sui generis existence, albeit on a lower level of generality than a society. 'Ontological arguments either rule out the existence of both groups and societies [as in methodological individualism] or accept both.' More generally, Aron is an example of a writer who appears to admire wistfully the great classical syntheses but seems unable to replicate them. Thus he contents himself with 'broad interpretations of industrial society' without 'systematizing' the 'conceptual framework' of the theoretical giants he depicts. Reinforcing these points, Anthony Giddens (1970: 134) is portrayed'. Instead, and despite many penetrating observations, one receives mostly 'ad hoc' criticisms that 'are rarely developed at any length'. These initial verdicts on Aron's work show the degree to which his writings engaged sociologists at an especially deep level of analysis. By clarifying what modern sociologists expect sociology to look like, they are also presentiments of his later reception failure. An inability to be systematic, to delineate the contours of the social, to develop core concepts, and to use exposition of the classics to launch a major theoretical restatement of his own -all detracted from Aron's credibility as a sociological theorist. As for Aron's more 'empirical' work on industrial society, this also provoked near ubiquitous theoretical and methodological complaint. The Economist's reviewer (Anon 1967 (Anon : 1664 was obviously puzzled at what Aron was up to in Eighteen Lectures on Industrial Society (1967b) . The Frenchman's claim to be using an analytical framework amounts to little more than two juxtaposed concepts: a 'model of growth' and 'a type of industrial society'. But what exactly is a model on Aron's reckoning? And is it a model at all without formalization? Alas, the 'general impression is one of common sense discourse interspersed with fairly unrelated methodological pronouncements. Thus the notion that economic growth depends on economic attitudes -interest in science, the habit of economic calculation, the desire for progress -is perfectly acceptable, Equally unimpressed were Aron's sociological colleagues. W.G. Runciman (1967: 23-4 ) declared the arguments of Eighteen Lectures to be 'unexceptionable' and 'a little disappointing'. The 'level of generality of the argument is throughout just a little too high' and too tentative: 'the provisos seem to swamp the hypotheses.' Steven Lukes (1967: 928-9 ) who, like Runciman, admired Main Currents wished that Eighteen Lectures were 'a little more analytical and systematic'. To be sure, Aron offers a welcome corrective to ideologically driven positions, and by reviving and reshaping Comte's idea of industrial society furnishes a 'valuable reorientation of perspective'. Yet what Aron says about modes of social inequality and the preconditions of industrialism is no longer fresh; it appears 'to be rather obvious, not to say banal'. Likewise, Wilhelm Baldamus (1967: 455-6) , reviewing Eighteen Lectures old hat: 'Aron's contribution to the study of industrial development is already so well known in this country that a detailed report on these books is unnecessary.' Baldamus concedes Aron's 'versatility' but expresses a lack of sympathy with both his politics (while Aron confesses to a form of 'conservatism', Baldamus's 'own value commitments are roughly the opposite of Professor Aron's) and with his method. Aron tells us that disciplined sociological analysis must attend to objective economic facts and restrain ideological predilection. Fine. The problem is that the facts that Aron cites, the indices he employs to make sense of them, and the conclusions he adduces are crudely assembled. The abundant use of measurement, in the two books under review, is 'puzzling as no attempt is made to connect interdependent economic variables with each other; there is not a single reference to the vast literature on post-Keynesian growth theory in mathematical Even Jon Elster (1983/4: 6) who reckons Eighteen Lectures and La lutte de classes to be Aron's most durable texts, characterizes them as masterpieces of haute vulgarization and 'relentless common sense'. One should read these books, Elster adds delphically, 'not so much in order to learn about society, as in order to learn how to think about society'. Yet Elster also believes that while, as a political writer, Aron 'conveys above all the austere demand for intellectual honesty', and is a shrewd observer of telling details and spurious analogies, sociologically he is a weak thinker with little 'creative imagination'. He has 'no eye for hidden analytical philosophical training. Conversely, for Anthony Giddens (1973: 59-63, 76-8) , it is precisely Aron's penchant to over-generalize that constitutes the main problem. It leads Aron to incorporate capitalism too readily into the master category of 'industrial society', to reduce 'class' (an explanatory realist concept standard sociological renderings) and to treat 'stratum' and 'class' as if they were the same things. All considered, Aron's theory 'makes little contribution towards reconceptualizing the notion of class' (Giddens 1973: 77) .
The publication of Aron's (1968a) Progress and Disillusion: The Dialectics of Modern Society prompted similarly negative reviews.
8 True, John Rex (1968a: 313-14) found its sweeping vistas 'exhilarating', a welcome respite from the dry as dust quantitative analysis for which sociology is notorious. Aron's analysis of the tensions among the three ideals of Western civilization -equality, personality and universality -is also stimulating. Yet Rex is unconvinced by Aron's explanations 7 Eighteen Lectures was frivolous and lacked 'hard data' according to Remi Clignet (1967: 207) , while The Industrial Society reminded Kim Rodner (1968: 302-3 ) of a 'speechwriter for a state college president' advertising his moderation. Aron's work, Rodner continued, came across as dated, poorly informed of relevant literature, laboured in its critiques, and tone deaf to 'cultural ecology' -Aron fails to recognize that growth means very different things in different societies, especially to the poor. Out of his depth in this domain, readers are better advised to consult Main Currents, a work with 'no equal in the historiography of these matters'.
The only strongly positive review of The Industrial Society I have found by a sociologist pluralist and politically wise' and, more generally, warms to Aron's critique of radical ideology and social engineering. More the pity, MacRae laments, that both are recrudescent among a new generation. 8 TLS reviewer (Anon. 1969: 651) was one. Progress and Disillusion was 'a stimulating tour de force which presents with admirable clarity some of the major issues of modern social controversy'. Even so, some of Aron's 'judgements seem … to have been overtaken by events' . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 
Political Sociology
Aron's writings on industrial society underwhelmed reviewers; his political sociology polarized them. On one side ranged critical enthusiasts -fallibilist bigtent thinkers such as Ernest Gellner and John Hall -for whom sociology was one identity among others; as if marking their own distance from the sociological mainstream, they wrote often in politics or literary journals. Gellner (1961) of Aron's 1938 doctoral thesis on the philosophy of history, Gellner pronounced it conceptually elliptical and linguistically clumsy, the 'early work of a man who has acquired, rightly, a quite outstanding reputation as a social thinker and an incisive writer'. But if the early work was serpentine and vertiginous, the mature political writing was lucid and clear-headed. Aron's (1970) Essai sur les libertés deserved to 'stand beside' J.S. Mill's On Liberty, Gellner (1966: 258) enthused. He particularly warmed to Aron's sociological 'probabilism', the notion, adapted from Tocqueville, that while history advances along no single path, 'not all possibilities are open'. Similarly, Aron's critique of technological determinism, and his France, could hardly be bettered as a framework 'to understand the alternatives and choices that face us' (ibid.: 260). Not that Gellner and Aron saw eye to eye on every issue. They disagreed, notably, in their appraisal of the prospects of liberalization in Central and Eastern Europe, Gellner being the more positive and, as it turned out, perspicacious party (Aron 1979a; Gellner 1979a Gellner , 1979b also Hall 1986: 156-7, 206-9 His general model is Montesquieu, and the mention of one of his masters demonstrates that Aron's 'sociology' is to be understood in the largest sense, that is, not as the study of the social but of the full workings, economic, political and ideological, of society as a whole. It is the greatest pity that Aron did not systematize the three [Sorbonne] courses, on economy, class structure and polity of East and West Europe, into a single book: and it is further to be regretted that only two of these [Eighteen Lectures on Industrial Society and Democracy and Totalitarianism] were translated into English, and then without a full appreciation of the project as a whole (Hall 1984: 425) .
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On the other side of the Aronian divide stood more perplexed or hostile critics. Reviewing Peace and War (1966) for the BJS, Robert Bierstedt (1967: 454-5) clearly wished Aron were an entirely different kind of political thinker, more utopian, less Machiavellian. While graced with a mind of unrivalled 'lucidity' and penetration, Aron 'offers us no vision of a new society'. On the contrary, 'comprehensive pessimism'. Aron's treatise 'is a sociology of international relations as they unfortunately are rather than a sociology of war and peace that would give us some perception, however dim, of a world that would war no more'. Roland Robertson (1968: 356-7) , reviewing the same book for Sociology conceded its 'vast array of insights, perspectives and data on vitally important subjects'. When it comes to observation on 'concrete features' of the international order, Aron is that offers no evident means 'to tackle problems of analysis in the international a sociology of international relations, notwithstanding his claim to do so. Aron's analysis was too traditional and hidebound, cleaving to a model of 'diplomaticstrategic action, as opposed to social action'. Socio-cultural factors, illuminated by writers such as Etzioni, Deutsch, Galtung, and Haas, are given 'virtually no attention'. Nor does Aron integrate into his analysis 'sociological concepts' such 11 La lutte de classes (1964) remains untranslated. Hall planned to write an intellectual biography of Aron for the publisher Longmans. It never appeared. Still, an expressly sympathetic appraisal of Aron is Hall 1981: 156-96, a book framed largely as a contribution to the philosophy of history rather than to sociology proper. Hall's (1981;  cogently, to keep Aron's ideas in play.
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3/31/2015 12:36:07 PM 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 British Sociology and Raymond Aron 25 A more caustic opinion of Aron's political sociology was expressed by Bierstedt's compatriot Thomas Lough (1970: 559-60) , who declared Democracy and Totalitarianism (1968b), 'dated, biased, and unsystematic' notwithstanding its 'interesting' analyses of violence, terror and political parties. The book is dated because it is a translation of lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in the later 1950s. It is biased because of its evident partiality towards the Western side of the cold war. And it is unsystematic because, lacking methodically gathered empirical data, its arguments are supported only by 'ad hoc historical facts'. John Rex (1968b: 612) likewise bemoaned a 'dreary wandering argument marked by a rather mean lack of objectivity in its discussion of matters relating to Marxism'. The book's pivot -a contrast between monopolistic and multi-party regimes -cannot disguise the fact that it has too little sociological analysis; the argument 'settles somewhere between that of Seymour Lipset's Political Man and the journalism of Peregrine Worsthorne'. It is all very well for Aron to be a multi-faceted, cross-discipline Simenon. The result is 'ultimately to base himself on no discipline at all'. We need sociology, Rex implores, not 'the better form of journalism'. Democracy and Totalitarianism simply fails to be what it sets out to be: 'a political sociology for our times.' 12 Lough, in the previously mentioned assessment, offers another criticism that is especially telling of how Aron bucked the expectations of sociologists interested in politics. Political sociologists, Lough stipulates, are scholars 'concerned with poverty, pollution, militarism, racism, and weapons of mass destruction'. Yet precisely on these problems Democracy and Totalitarianism is silent, and this dates it and limits its usefulness. Evident in such an opinion is the marked difference in meaning of 'political sociology' as Lough and Aron conceived it. For Lough, political sociology is concerned with 'world problems', with the interface of social ills and political behaviors. Political sociology and the sociology of politics shade into one another. Aron, conversely, separates them analytically and substantively. As he sees it, political sociology is focally concerned to examine the impact of politics on society, not the other way round. Its task is to show how politics is an independent force with independent dynamics -without a monopolistic party system, for instance, the Soviet Union would never have been able to collectivize agriculture or set industrial prices and quotas. Equally, because such a system prohibits civil society it is also far less amenable to social pressure than constitutionally pluralist societies are. Here, then, it is not only Aron's particular arguments that are problematic or 'reactionary' (Starr 1971: 159) to sociologists; the approach itself is utterly alien to their way of thinking.
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Progress and Disillusion, found Democracy and Totalitarianism 'somewhat disappointing'.
anything new about them'. Moreover, 'it seems to suffer more than the others books in the the question which it raises, often in the style of daily journalism'. 
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Yet, from a quite different vantage point, Aron's political theory was objectionable not because it was orthogonal but because it was conventional: a Bottomore (1966) , Aron was a political cousin of Schumpeter; both were theorists who considered democracy to be integrally a competition among elites. Yet Aron went further than Schumpeter by claiming that the plurality of elites -in government, trade unions, and in civil society -caused their division and lack of Soviet Union, orchestrated by the Communist Party. According to Bottomore, however, the Aronian approach is deeply conservative and tendentious. For one thing, Aron, like Schumpeter, appears to believe that Western democracy is somehow a completed project, whereas for democratic socialists such as Bottomore it is still in its infancy. Much more needs to be done to enable people to participate in decisions that affect their lives. For another, Bottomore disputes Aron's postulate that democracy in modern states is representative or it is nothing. Direct democracy is not the anachronism that many claim it to be, and if it is not a panacea it is at least a potential medium of involvement in the spheres of work and community. Indeed, Aron seems to concede as much in his remarks about the role played by professional and voluntary associations in modern life. Such organizations diffuse power by providing 'so many occasions and opportunities for ordinary men and women to learn and practice the business of self-government. They are the means through which government by the people is made more real and practical in a large, complex society' (ibid.: 126).
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What Gets Taught?
Until recently one could only speculate on how Aron's work, and that of numerous other writers, was communicated to students by British sociologists. Now we have a better sense, thanks to a cache of Sociology Teaching Materials collected by Jennifer Platt and archived in the LSE.
14 Platt is frank that the teaching materials -synoptic degree syllabi outlines; individual course reading lists; university Calendar digests -are not a 'representative sample of anything'; the cache represents all that she was able to gather, without any deliberate selection of topic areas. On one side of the spectrum, we have large collections of material: notably, from the universities of Edinburgh (1954 Edinburgh ( -2003 ; nineteen folders), Hull (1957 Hull ( -2006 ; fourteen folders) and Leicester (1952 Leicester ( -2004 ; eleven folders). On the other side, we have tiny deposits: for instance, from Brunel (c. 1969; ten sheets), Aberdeen (1972 Aberdeen ( -1982 ; one folder), Kent (1969 Kent ( -2003 ; two folders), Durham 13 theory of democracy to a theory of social classes. 14 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 British Sociology and Raymond Aron 27 (1965 Aron 27 ( -1998 ; three folders). Collections occupying the middle range include Sussex (1966 Sussex ( -2002 nine folders) and Bristol (1970s-2003 ; seven folders). Other discrepancies are obvious. Some syllabi are more detailed than others; gap years, both of short and long duration, are evident where syllabi are missing and the trail goes cold; not all universities and polytechnics are represented; and so forth. Even so, the Platt archive is the richest documentation yet assembled on British teaching recommendations in sociology. In regard to Aron, these materials tell us several things. They will tell us more, and with greater accuracy, if the archive is ever digitized. This would correct for human error (mine) by enabling accurate counts of Aron citations. Digitization would also enable the didactic usage of Aron to be compared with that of other sociologists. For instance, it would reveal precisely what I can only state impressionistically from a perusal, conducted over ten days in the spring of 2012, of all the folders and CDs: that, despite extensive translation, Aron is sociology) than contemporaries such as Frank Parkin, Ralf Dahrendorf, John Rex, Tom Bottomore, Reinhard Bendix, Robert Nisbet, W.G. Runciman and Anthony Giddens. I venture tentative explanations for this asymmetry as the story proceeds.
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indicative of broad trends rather than rigorously systematic accounting. Many nuances are obliterated, much colour bleached, in the generalizations that follow. First, the materials show which teachers cited Aron. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 same Aron text was cited more than once, I still counted the text only once. Using that method, Aron's work appears in at least 123 course syllabi. 16 Of that number, 79 references or sixty four per cent of the total refer to Main Currents, volume 1 being cited more often than volume 2. A more revealing number, however, is one that contrasts these 79 citations to the next most cited work -German Sociology (Aron 1964a ) -which receives only ten hits. Most of the other books mentioned in sociology syllabi -for instance, Opium of the Intellectuals (1985 [1955] ), La Lutte de classes (1964b), Progress and Disillusion (1968a) -garner four or fewer citations.
Suppose we divide Aron's texts into two broad categories: those principally of commentary or creative exegesis, and those that seek strategically to make a theoretical contribution in their own right. Main Currents, German Sociology and the books on the philosophy of history are salient examples of the former type; 17 the articles on class structure (Aron 1950 (Aron , 1969a , Democracy and Totalitarianism (1968b) , Eighteen Lectures on Industrial Society (1967b) are instances of the latter. On that basis, 91 counts or almost seventy four per cent of the total, refer to books of commentary, and 32 or only twenty six per cent refer to texts of theoretical contribution. The most cited theoretical article, at 8 counts, is the BJS two-parter (Aron 1950a and b) , while its later elaboration (Aron 1967d ) receives 3. Texts one would expect to be cited many times rarely receive a mention: the stunning example is Eighteen Lectures which picks up only eight mentions; the companion book The Industrial Society collects another four.
A third fact to emerge from the archive is doubtless related to the second. Because Aron was construed to be principally a commentator on the classical tradition rather than as an innovative theorist in his own right, Modern Theory courses tend to pass him by unless they have a prefatory section with a quasiclassics overview. Hence Aron is absent from Bryan Heading's (East Anglia, c. 1980) 18 page syllabus for Sociological Theory, a 'modern theory' course, dense with reading recommendations, whereas Giddens, Rex, Percy Cohen, Lenski, Runciman, Gouldner, Merton, Peter Blau, Ossowski and Dahrendorf all appear there. The same is true for John Holmwood's (Edinburgh, 1981 -1982 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 Social Theory (1971) . That book had three distinct advantages over Aron's Main Currents across seven individuals; it distilled those three authors into one volume, rather than Aron's two; and it set the classics in the frame of 'capitalism', a concept congenial to the Marxist tide in British sociology, instead of 'industrial society'. that fall squarely in his major topic areas, as if he really were of no consequence to them. The most obvious example is courses or sections of courses that concern Industrial Society. Examples are Industrial Society (Durham, 1966 (Durham, -1967 Sociological Theory and Industrial Society (Aberdeen, 1972-1974 Giddens (1973) , Scott (1979) and Kumar (1976 Kumar ( , 1978 quickly supplant the earlier writings of people like Clark Kerr, Daniel Bell and Aron. 18 This process of author-text displacement is common: faculty read new books, write new ones, many of these are synoptic and good to teach with and, accordingly, reference to older authorities declines. In time, the secondary sources become the primary ones and the cycle then repeats itself.
Was the growing criticism of Industrial Society the main cause of Aron's being sidelined? Possibly. Yet it bears emphasis that the critique of concepts such as Industrial Society -or Culture, Citizenship and Nation -in no way necessitates targets. Disputes keep works alive, totemic. The more individuals are criticized, the more entrenched their reputations become. The bigger problem for Aron, I suspect, was that the concept of Industrial Society was trumped by new labels that painted our social condition as 'post-industrial', post-modern', 'late modern', 'post-fordist' 'liquid' or 'risk' centred. Industrial Society, for all the sophistication Aron brought to it, looked old hat.
If I am right that Aron was swept away by a tide of new terms and debates, why, textbooks today? Was his book not about Class and Class Structure in Industrial 18 appraise him, and Kumar (1976 Kumar ( , 1978 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43 Before closing this brutally abbreviated section, shorn of many possible illustrations, I must address one area in which Aron (1966 Aron ( , 1974 Aron ( , 1985b Aron ( , 1985c What presence does this aspect of his work have in the Platt archive? Practically post-war British sociologists until the early eighties. But even then Aron is not conspicuously on the radar of those who taught these topics.
The paucity of Aron reference in this area may well be an artifact of the archive itself. It contains no syllabi on war and civil military relations of sociologists with a keen interest in these topics: Christopher Dandeker, John Hall, Anthony King, Lynn Jamieson and Donald MacKenzie. Michael Mann left Britain in 1987 to join the UCLA faculty; the previous decade he spent at the LSE has left no trace in the Platt archive. In any event, he tells me that 'Raymond Aron is one of the many distinguished social scientists whom I have barely ever read -in fact only Main Currents for teaching purposes' (email of July 3, 2012).
21 Clive Ashworth's Leicester syllabus on European Societies (Leicester 1986) emphasizes the neo-Machiavellian tradition of which Aron is a modern exemplar (Ashworth and Dandeker 1987: 7; also 1986 ); yet students are referred to Hall (1984b; cf. 1985) on Aron rather than any article or book by Aron himself. from dogmatic Marxism. Even then, the Frenchman's presence is slight. Professor Shaw remarks that 'When I turned to war at the beginning of the 1980s, although I attracted to his work' (email of 9 July). This is evident in the courses on Modern Aron (1958 and 1978) pieces on war.
Conclusion
Reputational success, the formation of the so-called 'canon', is a common topic of sociological discussion. Reputational collapse attracts less attention (McLaughlin 1998; Turner 2007 ). This essay is a contribution to its study. When A.H. Halsey (2004: 169-79) conducted his 2001 survey of British chair professors (n. 255) and asked them 'Who have been the most important mentors in your career?' and 'In the world as a whole which sociologists of the twentieth century have contributed most to the subject', Raymond Aron appears in neither category. 23 In a subject 24 for this state of affairs. Aron was a liberal conservative in a leftist discipline. 25 His measured lucidity -'a respect for the humble fact is one of the qualities that keep his prose permanently fresh' remarked Clive James (2007: 37) -collides with what British social theorists expect of their French counterparts: opacity, iconoclasm, promethean ambition. Yet, as this article has shown, Aron also failed to live up to what sociologists more generally expect of the discipline: digestible concepts; theoretical systems; methodological design; in a word, 'professionalism'. Aron mass of sociologists.
If, as Nietzsche said, some writers are born posthumously might others be posthumously re-born? Some renewed interest in Aron is certainly evident today.
26
Might that portend a larger reappraisal? We cannot know. Yet a nagging question hangs over anyone who takes the trouble to read Aron carefully in the context of 22 Modern Industrial Society. 23 most cited author in the 1970s (175). 24 Elliott (2009) and Blackhouse and Fontaine (2010 ). 25 1979a : 49-50 and 1979b Journal of Classical Sociology (Baehr ( , 2011b ) and the work of Robbins (2011 Robbins ( , 2012 , Scott (2011) and du Gay and Scott (2010) . More evanescently, see Alexander 1995: 6-64 and 211, n. 43 . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44 
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